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Class Dismissed? The Potential Unavailability of 
Class Actions Under Mineral Code Article 137 in 
Louisiana Federal Courts 
INTRODUCTION 
Louisiana state courts and Louisiana federal courts differ 
concerning the availability of class notice under Mineral Code 
article 137, which requires mineral lessors to give 30 days’ notice 
before receiving the right to sue for unpaid or underpaid mineral 
royalties.1 Unfortunately, the Louisiana legislature was unclear on 
Mineral Code article 137’s applicability to class actions, leading to 
judicial interpretation. The Louisiana state courts hold that notice 
under Mineral Code article 137 is satisfied when a single plaintiff 
gives notice on behalf of the entire class.2 These cases reason that 
Mineral Code article 137’s “notice as a prerequisite” requirement 
intends to give the lessee reasonable warning of the nature of the 
demand for unpaid or underpaid royalties, which a single demand 
letter by a class representative successfully accomplishes.3 
Therefore, a class may be analyzed for certification even though the 
unnamed class plaintiffs do not give notice under Mineral Code 
article 137. 
On the other hand, Louisiana federal courts hold that the 
Louisiana state courts’ interpretation of Mineral Code article 137 is 
incorrect. They reason that, if the Louisiana Supreme Court heard 
the issue, it would strictly read Mineral Code article 137’s text to not 
allow class notice in mineral royalty lawsuits.4 Thus, under the 
Louisiana federal courts’ interpretation, unnamed class plaintiffs 
who fail to provide notice under Mineral Code article 137 may not 
participate in a class action. This interpretation has serious 
ramifications for the utility, and possibility even the availability, of 
mineral royalty class actions in Louisiana federal courts. 
In early 2013, the Western District of Louisiana confronted the 
necessary question of whether Mineral Code article 137, as 
interpreted by Louisiana federal courts, applies in federal court 
because its prohibition of class notice creates tension with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions in federal 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by WILLIAM K. WRIGHT IV. 
 1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:137–31:138 (2013). 
 2. Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1011 (La. App. 
1 Cir. 1997); Duhé v. Texaco, Inc., 779 So. 2d 1070, 1087 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2001). 
 3. Lewis, 398 So. 2d at 1011. See also Duhé, 779 So. 2d at 1086. 
 4. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 128 F.Supp.2d 961, 969 
(W.D. La. 2001). See also Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 
1868750, at *1, *9 (W.D. La. 2011). 
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court.5 Under a line of cases after the Supreme Court of the United 
States’ Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins decision, a federal court must 
conduct a special analysis to determine whether a federal rule or a 
colliding state rule applies to the issue at hand.6 Moreover, although 
Hanna v. Plumer provides the proper analytical framework for 
resolving potential conflicts between state rules and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has not conclusively explained 
how to determine whether a collision exists.7 The Court’s fractured 
decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate 
Insurance Co. demonstrates this notion.8 
Confronted with this difficult jurisprudence, the Western District 
of Louisiana applied the narrowest Shady Grove opinion,9 
concluding that the federal courts’ interpretation of Mineral Code 
article 137 indeed applied.10 However, considering the tenuousness 
of the Shady Grove decision,11 as well as the fact that the Louisiana 
Supreme Court has yet to speak on the proper interpretation of 
Mineral Code article 137 as it relates to class notice, this problem 
remains an open issue. 
Therefore, this comment will accomplish two goals. First, it 
will demonstrate that the proper interpretation of Mineral Code 
article 137 does not allow class notice by applying Louisiana 
principles of statutory interpretation to derive the proper 
interpretation of Mineral Code article 137. Second, this comment 
will conclude that the federal courts should apply the proper 
interpretation of Mineral Code article 137 despite apparent conflict 
with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because 
Mineral Code article 137 and Rule 23 perform completely different 
functions. This will be accomplished by demonstrating that, while 
the Louisiana federal courts were correct in their assertion that 
Mineral Code article 137 and Rule 23 do not cover the same 
                                                                                                             
 5. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2013 WL 951251, at *1, *6 
(W.D. La. 2013). 
 6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (standing for the proposition that the Rules of 
Decision Act—and federalism principles—requires federal courts to apply the 
rules of decision of the state providing the cause of action). 
 7. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Hanna is part of a line of cases referred to as the 
“procedural Erie doctrine.” Readers unfamiliar with, or who need a refresher on 
the doctrine, should refer to Part IV, particularly note 132 and accompanying 
discussion. 
 8. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). Shady Grove was a plurality opinion with a Justice 
count of 4 plurality-1 concurring-4 dissenting. Moreover, the concurring Justice, 
Justice Stevens, has since retired from the Court, and we have yet to discover 
Justice Kagan’s stance on this doctrine. 
 9. See infra note 68 and accompanying discussion. 
 10. Williams, 2013 WL 951251 at *10–12. 
 11. See supra note 8. 
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ground, there are additional reasons for such a conclusion. Also, 
this comment will demonstrate that Shady Grove did not affect the 
collision analysis as it pertains to Mineral Code article 137. 
Part I of this comment briefly discusses Louisiana Mineral 
Code article 137 and the Mineral Code as a whole. Part II 
discusses the problem this comment intends to resolve: the 
divergence between Louisiana state courts and Louisiana federal 
courts on the issue of class notice under Mineral Code article 137. 
Part III conducts a statutory analysis of Mineral Code article 137, 
employing principles of Louisiana statutory interpretation, in order 
to unearth the correct interpretation of Mineral Code article 137. 
Part IV discusses the development of the procedural Erie doctrine 
from Erie to Shady Grove. Finally, Part V demonstrates that the 
proper interpretation of Mineral Code article 137 does not collide 
with Federal Rule 23 and will survive a proper application of the 
Erie/Hanna analysis. 
I.  THE LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE AND MINERAL CODE ARTICLE 137 
The Louisiana Mineral Code is intended to be “supplementary . . 
. to the Louisiana Civil Code.”12 Because the mineral laws of 
Louisiana devolved from the Civil Code, the Louisiana Legislature 
intended the Mineral Code to be a “specialized extension of the 
Civil Code,” even though such provisions are part of Louisiana’s 
Revised Statutes.13 Further, the comment to Mineral Code article 2 
explicitly states that an “additional purpose of Article 2 is [to] 
prevent . . . the inappropriate transfer of the principles of the Mineral 
Code . . . to resolve questions that are properly governed by the 
general principles of the Civil Code.” 14 
Louisiana Mineral Code article 137 is the crux of the set of 
rights and procedures—collectively found in Mineral Code articles 
137-141—that Louisiana offers to parties to sue for past-due or 
underpaid mineral lease royalties. Mineral Code article 137 requires 
a mineral lessor who “seeks relief for the failure of his lessee to 
make timely or proper payment of royalties [to give] his lessee 
                                                                                                             
 12. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2 (2013). 
 13. Id. at cmt. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:1 cmt. (2013) (“Although 
the authorized forms of citation include reference to provisions of this code by 
using the traditional form for citation of the Revised Statutes, it is hoped that 
because of the relationship of this code to the Civil Code and the attempt to 
structure it more in the style of a code than a statute, the preferred practice will 
grow to be that of citing particular provisions as articles of the Mineral Code.”). 
 14. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2 cmt. (2013) This demonstrates that the 
provisions of the Mineral Code are to be interpreted using the Civil Code’s 
interpretative methods, which is discussed infra Part III.A–B. 
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written notice of such [failure to pay] as a prerequisite” to bringing a 
lawsuit.15 After the lessor waits a minimum of 30 days for the 
lessee’s response, he then receives the right to file a lawsuit seeking 
remedies that are based on the response—or lack thereof—from the 
lessee.16 Further, the lessee’s response directly affects the remedies 
the lessor may seek.17 
II. LOUISIANA’S JURISPRUDENTIAL DIVIDE REGARDING ARTICLE 137 
Louisiana courts, state and federal alike, agree that plaintiffs 
“have no right to proceed” with a mineral royalty action if they fail 
to comply with the requirements of Mineral Code article 137’s 
notice prerequisite.18 However, the Louisiana state courts and 
Louisiana federal courts do disagree on whether a named class 
plaintiff can provide article 137 notice on behalf of unnamed 
mineral lessors who are purported class plaintiffs. 
A. Louisiana State Court Jurisprudence 
Sans one case,19 Louisiana state courts have held that class notice 
is acceptable under article 137.20 In Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & 
                                                                                                             
 15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 (2013) (“[W]ritten notice . . . [is a] 
prerequisite to a judicial demand for damages or dissolution of the lease.”) 
[hereinafter article 137]. 
 16. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:138 (2013) (“The lessee shall have thirty days 
after receipt of the required notice . . . to pay the royalties due or to respond by 
stating in writing a reasonable cause for nonpayment. The payment or nonpayment 
of the royalties or stating or failing to state a reasonable cause for nonpayment . . . 
has the following effect on the remedies of dissolution and damages.”). LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 31:138.1–31:141 (2013) stipulate the different remedies available, 
depending on whether and how the lessor responds. 
 17. Id. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:138.1–31:141 (2013) (discussing 
the types of remedies offered based on how the lessee responds to article 137 
notice). 
 18. See, e.g., Rebstock v. Birthright Oil & Gas Co., 406 So. 2d 636, 642–43 
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1981). Louisiana federal courts also agree with the notion that lack 
of Mineral Code article 137 notice is an absolute bar to seeking a mineral royalty 
claim. See also Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 1868750, 
at *1, *6 (W.D. La. 2011) (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 
128 F.Supp.2d 961, 965 (W.D. La. 2001)). 
 19. See Stoute v. Wagner & Brown, 637 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (La. App. 1 Cir. 
1994) (adopting the findings of the trial court as its own, which found that “only 
those royalty owners who have written a demand for past royalties may sue their 
gas producers . . . therefore, there are a limited number of royalty owners who 
have the right to sue”). 
 20. See Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001 (La. 
App. 1 Cir. 1997), writ denied, 706 So. 2d 454 (La. 1997); Duhé v. Texaco, Inc., 
779 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2001), writ denied, 791 So. 2d 637 (La. 2001). 
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Production Company, five lessors sent Texaco, the mineral lessee, 
two demand letters demanding proceeds from a contract dispute 
settlement between Texaco and another oil company.21 One demand 
letter was on behalf of all mineral lessors, while the other was on 
behalf of themselves, as individual plaintiffs.22 Texaco objected, 
arguing that article 137 “does not permit a written demand for royalty 
payments to be made on behalf of unnamed lessors.”23 In its analysis, 
the court recognized that “the notice requirements set forth in [article 
137] are an indispensible prerequisite to a judicial demand . . . .”24 
The court found that “[n]owhere in the statute is there a 
requirement that . . . notice be given by each and every mineral 
lessor individually.”25 The court also found that article 137’s use of 
“he” and “lessor” in the singular is not indicative of legislative intent 
to require individual notice because Louisiana interpretative 
techniques allow the singular and the plural to be interchangeable.26 
Finally, the court found that the “obvious purpose” of article 137 
notice is to give the lessee reasonable notice of a deficient payment 
and reasonable time to correct it after an appropriate investigation.27 
The court reasoned that, because the representative plaintiffs’ class 
demand letter fully apprised Texaco of (1) the nature of the claim 
for unpaid royalties, (2) the identity of the lessors for whom the 
demand was made, and (3) what contracts were in dispute, Texaco 
was able to conduct a reasonable investigation into the claims and 
adequately respond under Mineral Code article 138.28 Thus, the 
class was subsequently certified as a class action under Louisiana 
law.29 
However, the three-judge panel produced one dissent.30 Judge 
Parro explained that article 137 is “clear and unambiguous,” requiring 
“each lessor [to] give written notice to his lessee based on the 
individual contractual relationship between the lessor and the 
lessee.”31 He further reasoned that article 137 does not authorize one 
                                                                                                             
 21. 698 So. 2d at 1006. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1007. In other words, Texaco argued that there was no such thing 
as a “‘class action’ demand letter” under article 137. Thus, those plaintiffs who 
had not individually given article 137 notice had no right of action. 
 24. Id. at 1009. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. The court seemed to believe that allowing Texaco to investigate each 
plaintiff’s claim was more important than meeting the requirements for a class 
action. 
 27. 698 So. 2d at 1010. 
 28. Id. at 1011. 
 29. Id. at 1016. 
 30. Id. (Parro, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. (Parro, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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lessor to give notice on behalf of another lessor, whether named or 
unnamed.32 He refuted the majority’s contention that no jurisprudence 
exists on the adequacy of notice by pointing out that the same court’s 
1994 opinion in Stoute v. Wagner & Brown strictly interpreted the 
language of article 137 to find that class notice is prohibited by the 
plain meaning of the article.33 Although Judge Parro did not rule out 
the possibility of class actions so long as each individual class 
plaintiff gives individual notice, he noted that he would have held that 
the plain language of article 137 does not allow one class 
representative (or a few class representatives) to give notice on behalf 
of other, unnamed plaintiffs.34 
In a similar case, Duhé v. Texaco, a unanimous panel cited 
Lewis’ holding and reasoning with approval.35 In Duhé, Texaco 
argued that the district court erred in certifying the class because not 
all class members made individual, written demands pursuant to 
article 137.36 Mirroring the Lewis decision, the Duhé court rejected 
Texaco’s argument, and instead, the court concluded article 137 
does not require individual notice in a multiple-plaintiff lawsuit, 
such as a class action.37 Moreover, the court reasoned that it is 
“sufficient if the notice fully and completely notifies the lessee of 
the demands of the named plaintiffs, as well as the intention of those 
named plaintiffs to demand royalty payments on behalf of a class of 
royalty owners.”38 
Louisiana courts tend to allow class representatives to give 
notice on behalf of unnamed class plaintiffs in mineral royalty 
class actions. However, while the Louisiana jurisprudence provides 
some indication that article 137 notice can be given by a class 
representative (or by multiple class representatives) on behalf of a 
class of mineral lessors, the Louisiana federal courts reject this line 
of jurisprudence in reaching the exact opposite conclusion. 
Additionally, Louisiana federal courts reject the notion that class 
                                                                                                             
 32. Id. (Parro, J., dissenting). 
 33. 698 So. 2d at 1016 (Parro, J., dissenting) (citing Stoute v. Wagner & 
Brown, 637 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1994)). The majority cited 
Stoute in its opinion also, but only for the class certification analysis, not for the 
class notice analysis. See also Willis v. Franklin, 420 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (La. 
App. 3 Cir. 1982). Although Willis concerned multiple plaintiffs and did not 
give rise to a class action, its individual notice analysis was likewise applicable 
in Lewis. 
 34. Lewis, 698 So. 2d at 1017 (Parro, J., dissenting). 
 35. Duhé v. Texaco, 779 So. 2d 1070, 1087 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2001). 
 36. Id. at 1075. 
 37. Id. at 1087 (affirming the district court’s certification of the class because 
article 137’s notice prerequisite was met, as well as the class certification 
prerequisites under Louisiana law). 
 38. Id. 
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notice satisfies article 137 and require that each individual lessor 
give his lessee notice, regardless of whether the defendant lessee is 
the same for each purported class plaintiff.39 
B. Louisiana Federal Court Jurisprudence 
Two Louisiana federal court cases considered the issue of class 
notice under article 137: Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish 
School Board40 and Williams v. Chesapeake Louisiana., Inc.41 In 
both of these cases, the federal court ruled that the plain language 
of article 137 does not permit class notice.42 However, the opinions 
do not explicitly hold whether the plain language of article 137 
completely prohibits class actions or merely prohibits class actions 
where each class plaintiff has not given individual notice. 
In Vermillion, Chevron and other oil company lessees sought a 
declaratory judgment, arguing that (1) the demand letters sent by 
the class representatives on behalf of a class of mineral lessors 
were insufficient to satisfy article 137’s requirement, and (2) the 
demand letters failed to reasonably put the oil companies on notice 
of the individual claims of either the class representatives or the 
unnamed class plaintiffs.43 The district court found that each class 
                                                                                                             
 39. The route the Louisiana federal courts follow mirrors the Louisiana state 
court decision of Stoute v. Wagner & Brown, 637 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (La. App. 1 
Cir. 1994), and Judge Parro’s dissent in Lewis v. Texaco, 698 So. 2d 1001,1016 
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1997) (Parro, J., dissenting). 
 40. The Vermillion case has a tumultuous procedural history. The relevant 
decisions for the purposes of this comment are found in three different citations, 
all with the title Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish School Board. The 
court of first instance was the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Louisiana. 128 F.Supp.2d 961 (W.D. La. 2001). Then, the case was 
referred to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which made a ruling 
and certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. 364 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 
2004). After the Louisiana Supreme Court declined to answer the certified 
question, 872 So. 2d 533 (La. 2004), the case returned to the Fifth Circuit. 377 
F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 41. Similar to the Vermillion case, the Williams case also has a turbulent 
procedural history. The three relevant decisions for this comment are unreported 
decisions out of the Western District of Louisiana. Williams v. Chesapeake La., 
Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 1868750, at *1 (W.D. La. 2011); Williams v. 
Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2013 WL 951251, at *1 (W.D. La. 2013); 
Williams v. Chesapeake La. Inc., 2013 No. 10-1906, 2013 WL 5295692 (W.D. 
La. 2013). 
 42. Vermillion, 128 F.Supp.2d at 967-68. See also Williams, 2013 WL 951251 
at *2 (“The court is satisfied with its interpretation of Louisiana law, this is, [article 
137] requires notice to the lessee as a prerequisite to suit.”). 
 43. Vermillion, 128 F.Supp.2d at 961. 
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plaintiff must give article 137 notice44 because such a rule is clear, 
unambiguous, and produces no absurd consequences.45 Because of 
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s silence regarding the availability of 
class notice under article 137, the court reasoned that the Louisiana 
Supreme Court would follow the Stoute decision, reject the Lewis 
majority,46 and preclude class notice under article 137.47 However, 
recognizing the importance of the issue, the district court certified 
its decision to the Fifth Circuit to either certify the question to the 
Louisiana Supreme Court or dispose of the issue itself.48 
After receiving the certified issue, the Fifth Circuit in turn 
certified the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court,49 which 
declined to answer the certified question.50 When the case returned 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. at 968. The district court looked to the Stoute case, which held that 
only those lessors that sent timely article 137 notice could proceed with the 
lawsuit and decided that the Louisiana Supreme Court would adopt the 
interpretation of Stoute. 
 45. Id. at 967–68. The district court found that the royalty owners’ demand 
letters were “legally insufficient” to serve as written notice on behalf of unnamed 
royalty owners under article 137, “and, therefore, class action relief [was] 
unavailable under such circumstances.” The district court’s phrasing is curious 
because it says “class action relief is unavailable under such circumstances” 
(emphasis added). This raises the question of whether the court intended to rule that 
class notice is unavailable at all times under article 137 or unavailable only when 
each class member fails to give individual notice. While it is hard to envision a 
situation where representatives of a class of plaintiffs can argue that every “similarly 
situated” plaintiff possible gave individual notice, the court here approved of Stoute 
v. Wagner & Brown, 637 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1994), which found “a 
limited number of royalty owners . . . have the right to sue” in reference to the class 
representatives who gave individual notice. This indicates that class actions are 
likely available as long as each class plaintiff gives notice pursuant to article 137. 
This contemplates that the unnamed class plaintiffs that give article 137 notice are 
removed from the class, and those that gave article 137 notice may proceed with the 
class action if pursuing it is still desirable. 
 46. The district court would follow Judge Parro’s Lewis dissent. Lewis v. 
Texaco, 698 So. 2d 1001,1016 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1997) (Parro, J., dissenting). See 
also Part II.A. 
 47. Id. at 968-69. The district court justified taking an “Erie guess” as to 
what the Supreme Court of Louisiana would decide if it heard the case. Under 
Erie, the federal courts are to apply the substantive law of the forum state. When 
a state supreme court has not issued a ruling on the issue, a federal court may 
essentially sit as a state high court and consider a wide range of sources and 
policy considerations to arrive at the proper construction of the state law. 
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). 
 48. Id. at 969. The court did this in accordance with Rule 50 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 49. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 364 F.3d 607 (5th 
Cir. 2004). 
 50. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 872 So. 2d 533 (La. 
2004). The Louisiana Supreme Court could have resolved the issue by devising 
the proper construction of article 137 as it relates to class notice. Instead, the 
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to the Fifth Circuit, the court encountered the choice of either 
accepting the Louisiana state courts’ interpretation of article 137, 
or affirming the district court’s interpretation of article 137. The 
court chose the latter option, holding that it was not bound by any 
Louisiana state court decision because the “jurisprudence ha[d] not 
developed to the status of jurisprudence contstante,”51 and the 
plain language of the statute led to the conclusion that class notice 
is not compatible with article 137.52 
The Fifth Circuit also considered the context of article 137 with 
Mineral Code articles 138-141 and properly understood that article 
137 bore a significant relationship to the rights and remedies that 
arose depending on how the lessee responds to article 137 notice.53 
The Fifth Circuit provided three reasons why this relationship is 
both “incompatible with allowing notice to be given on a class 
basis”54 and thwarts the power balance the Louisiana Legislature 
intentionally created by providing lessors a method to vindicate 
their royalty claims, while giving lessees a reasonable delay to 
avoid the “harsh remedy” of cancellation.55 
First, permitting class notice in this type of statutory 
framework would deprive the lessee of any realistic chance to 
reasonably respond within the 30-day timeframe.56 Second, it was 
                                                                                                             
 
court abdicated its judgment to the U.S. Fifth Circuit, leading to the divergence 
this comment discusses and seeks to resolve. 
 51. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 377 F.3d 459, 462 (5th 
Cir. 2004). See, e.g., Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000), 
which illustrates the application of jurisprudence constante. Jurisprudence constante 
is a civil law principle that embodies a fundamental difference between the common 
law and the civil law. Succinctly put, case law does not have the same precedential 
effect as it does at common law, which allows civilian judges to disregard past 
decisions that are not “a constant stream of uniform . . . rulings having the same 
reasoning.” This means that legislation is the supreme source of law, and case law 
merely is “evidence” of what the legislation means. Thus, case law does not have the 
controlling effect on decisions that legislation possesses. This is why the Fifth 
Circuit was comfortable with ignoring the few Louisiana cases interpreting article 
137 in favor of the district court’s interpretation. 
 52. Vermillion, 377 F.3d at 461. 
 53. Id. at 462. 
 54. Id. at 463. 
 55. Id. at 464 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt. (2013)). The court 
found that the Louisiana legislature was concerned with striking the balance 
between giving lessors the right to a judicial remedy for unpaid mineral royalties 
and limiting judicial dissolution of complex, economically-impactful, mineral 
leases by promoting settlement before any litigation occurs. 
 56. Id. at 464. In this case, the intended class would have been made up of 
each of Chevron’s mineral lessors in the entire state of Louisiana. The court 
clearly was concerned about Chevron needing to go through every lease it had 
with Louisiana residents to determine how to proceed. 
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“questionable” whether the putative class representatives could 
make an article 137 demand for lessors who do not know that 
demand is being made on their behalf, or even want demand to be 
made on their behalf.57 Third, it was unclear to the court to whom 
the lessees should respond under Mineral Code article 138.58 The 
third consideration is the most important because it is unclear what 
the proper remedies are or who would receive the payments 
because the statutory framework does not contemplate class 
actions in mineral royalty lawsuits. 
The most recent Louisiana federal court case that tackles the issue 
of class notice under article 137 is Williams v. Chesapeake 
Louisiana., Inc.59 In Williams, many mineral lessors sued Chesapeake 
for underpaid mineral royalties after the named plaintiff purportedly 
sent notice on behalf of the putative class. Like other courts that 
assessed the issue, the district court understood the strong policy 
consideration underlying the notice and reply framework of article 
137, et seq.60 With this in mind, the district court followed the Fifth 
Circuit’s Vermillion decision, holding that “as a matter of law” the 
notice letter the lead plaintiff sent on behalf of herself and the other 
mineral lessors, was insufficient to fulfill the others’ article 137 notice 
requirement.61 
However, Williams went further than Vermillion, explicitly 
holding that “the putative class members did not have a substantive 
right of action to seek unpaid mineral royalties” as a class under 
article 137.62 The notion that the mineral lessors that failed to 
provide article 137 notice had no right of action was not explicitly 
mentioned in any previous article 137 class notice case. However, 
in Vermillion, the district court subscribed to the notion of “no 
notice, no right.”63 This demonstrates the court read article 137 
notice to trigger a substantive right of action to claim unpaid or 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id.  
 58. Vermillion, 377 F.3d at 464. 
 59. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2011 WL 1868750, at 
*1–2 (W.D. La. 2011) (finding that a mineral royalty lawsuit was proper 
because “[im]proper payment,” such as underpayment, is a reason to provide 
notice under article 137). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 (2013). 
 60. Williams, 2011 WL 1868750 at *5. See also Vermillion, 377 F.3d at 464. 
 61. Vermillion, 377 F.3d at 464*11. 
 62. Id. (emphasis added). The closest a Louisiana court got to this notion 
was that article 137 notice is an absolute prerequisite to suit. Rebstock v. 
Birthright Oil & Gas Co., 406 So. 2d 636, 642–43 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1981). See 
also supra note 18 and accompanying discussion. 
 63. Williams, 2011 WL 1868750 at *5–6 (W.D. La. 2013) (“The Court is 
satisfied with its interpretation of Louisiana law, that is, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§31:137 requires notice to the lessee as a prerequisite to suit.”). 
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underpaid mineral royalties, which the unnamed class members 
had failed to satisfy.64 
In March 2013, the Williams court addressed the class notice issue 
again, this time after recognizing a conflict between article 137 and 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of the Civil Procedure.65 Here, the 
district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification for 
the same reasons as set forth in its previous order.66 However, the 
court recognized the real issue in the motion at bar was whether 
article 137’s prohibition of class notice67 or Federal Rule 23, which 
has no notice requirement, applied to the case. To analyze this issue, 
the Western District turned to Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.68 
Applying Justice Stevens’ Shady Grove principles,69 the district court 
found that the properly-interpreted Louisiana rule must control.70 
                                                                                                             
 64. This notion is supported by Rebstock, 406 So. 2d at 642–43, as well as 
Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1006 (La. App. 1 
Cir. 1997). See also supra notes 18 and 21 and accompanying discussion. 
 65. Williams, 2011 WL 951251 at *2 (“[T]he issue before the Court is how 
to resolve the conflict between this Louisiana statute and [Rule 23].”). 
 66. Id. at *5–6 (“The Court is satisfied with its interpretation of Louisiana law, 
that is, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §31:137 requires notice to the lessee as a prerequisite to 
suit.”). 
 67. Id. at *6. In other words, the correct interpretation of article 137, as the 
Louisiana federal courts and this comment contend. 
 68. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 
416 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). Shady Grove involved a fractured Supreme 
Court employing three different methods to obtain two separate results, producing a 
plurality opinion. The district court used Justice Stevens’ concurrence because it 
provided the crucial fifth vote and concurred on the narrowest ground. Williams, 
2013 WL 951251 at *11 (citing Garman v. Campbell County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630 
F.3d 977, 983 n.6 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977)). 
 69. According to the Williams court, Justice Stevens found that the federal 
rules must follow the Rules Enabling Act’s requirement to not abridge, enlarge, 
or modify any substantive right granted by state law. Williams, 2013 WL 
951251 at *9 (citing Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 418). A federal rule that appears 
to do so must be reasonably interpreted to avoid that result. Id. (citing Shady 
Grove, 559 U.S. at 424–25). If the federal rule cannot be reasonably interpreted 
to avoid abridgment, enlargement, or modification of any substantive right, thus 
displacing a state law that looks procedural, but is nevertheless intertwined with 
a state-created right, the state rule must be applied. Id. (citing Shady Grove, 559 
U.S. at 423–24). The district court found that Rule 23 “‘categorically’” entitles 
plaintiffs to pursue a class action in federal court when the four prerequisites are 
met. Thus, a collision existed between Rule 23 and article 137. Id. (citing Shady 
Grove, 559 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J.)). However, the district court held that 
applying Rule 23 alters Louisiana substantive law, which is outside the 
authorization of the Rules Enabling Act, and, therefore, the court was required 
to apply article 137’s prohibition of class notice to the mineral royalty lawsuit. 
Id. at *15–16. In other words, the district court found Rule 23 prevented article 
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As demonstrated by the history of article 137 class notice in 
both the Louisiana state and federal courts, a two-question inquiry 
is required in order to determine the availability and utility of class 
actions for Louisiana mineral royalty claims. First, does the proper 
interpretation of article 137 preclude class notice? Second, is 
article 137’s notice requirement applicable in Louisiana federal 
courts in light of Rule 23? 
III. THE PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF ARTICLE 137 PRECLUDES 
CLASS NOTICE 
A. The Tenets of Louisiana Statutory Interpretation 
Louisiana law is unique in that its civilian tradition dictates that 
attorneys and judges look to a plain-language reading of legislation, 
rather than the jurisprudence, in arguing and deciding cases.71 The 
fundamental tenets of civil law dictate that judges are to extract as 
much meaning out of the text of a Code article or statute in 
determining its proper construction because the legislature, not the 
judiciary, is the governmental body elected to make law.72 Only after 
a judge thoroughly analyzes the text of a law may he proceed to other 
forms of statutory interpretation, such as legislative intent.73 The 
Mineral Code, as a supplement to the Civil Code, should be 
interpreted in a similar fashion as Code articles.74 
                                                                                                             
 
137’s no class notice rule from operating. The prohibition of class notice is “so 
interwoven with [Louisiana’s] substantive law governing the payment of 
mineral royalties in Louisiana that it is a substantive rule,” as demonstrated in 
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 377 F.3d 459, 462 (5th Cir. 
2004). See also supra note 554 and accompanying discussion. 
 70. Williams, 2013 WL 951251 at *13–15. 
 71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2013) (“The sources of [Louisiana] law are 
legislation and custom.”). See also id. cmt. c (“In Louisiana, legislation is superior to 
any source of law.”). Jurisprudence, on the other hand, is just evidence of what the 
law is and expounds on the proper interpretations of legislation. See also cases cited 
supra note 51. 
 72. P. RAYMOND LAMONICA & JERRY G. JONES, LEGIS. LAW & PROC. 
COMPANION HANDBOOK § 7.4, (2014 ed.) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter 
LAMONICA & JONES]. 
 73. Id. at § 7.6 (“It is only when the meaning of the words cannot be determined 
from the legislation itself or through resort to statutes specifically addressing the 
meaning of words used in the legislation . . . that there is a need to look beyond the 
specific legislation.” (emphasis in original)). 
 74. See supra note 12 and accompanying discussion. 
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Articles 9 through 13 of the Louisiana Civil Code codify the 
fundamental principles of Louisiana statutory interpretation.75 
First, when the applicable law is clear and unambiguous and its 
application does not lead to absurd results, the law must be applied 
as written.76 A court may interpret no further, such as seeking 
legislative intent, if application of the plain language produces a 
result that is within the purpose of the law.77 However, if the 
applicable law is susceptible to different meanings, and the plain 
language approach fails, then the law must be interpreted as having 
the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.78 
Further, laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in 
reference to each other.79 Finally, as stipulated in the Louisiana 
Revised Statutes, the singular and plural are interchangeable when 
interpreting Louisiana law.80 
Only after the court fully attempts to extract the proper, plain 
reading from the applicable law may the judge use legislative history, 
along with logic and reason, in order to arrive at the proper 
construction of the applicable law.81 Scholars call this type of 
statutory interpretation, one that goes beyond the text into legislative 
history and legislative purpose of the applicable law, the “historical 
approach.”82 If the judge can ascertain the “broad statutory policy” 
                                                                                                             
 75. The techniques described above form what scholars call the exegetical 
method of statutory interpretation. 
 76. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2013). 
 77. Id. See also LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 72 at § 7.4. The test for 
determining if an “absurd consequence” arises through applying plain meaning is to 
assess whether a “factual result so inappropriate as to be deemed outside the 
‘purpose’ of the law” occurs. If so, then the court may use other interpretative 
methods, such as reason and legislative intent to reach the correct construction of the 
law. 
 78. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2013); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 12 (2013); 
LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 722 at § 7.6. 
 79. LA. CIV. CODE ANN art. 10 (2013). See also LAMONICA & JONES, supra 
note 722 at § 7.7 (“[S]tatutes on the same subject matter should be interpreted in 
reference to each other, if such is necessary to determine the meaning of words or 
phrases in a particular statute.”). This is called interpreting statutes in pari materia. 
 80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:7 (2013). 
 81. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4 (2013) (“To decide equitably, resort is made to 
justice, reason, and prevailing usages.”). 
 82. For a full discussion on civilian statutory interpretation outside the text 
of an applicable statute see LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 722 at §§ 7.8-7.9. It 
suffices to say that the civilian tradition recognizes that the political, social, and 
economic context of the applicable statute is valuable in discovering the purpose 
of the statute. Further, legislative history is not the same as legislative intent, 
although documents that comprise legislative history are great indicators of 
legislative intent, or the purpose of the legislation. 
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behind the applicable law, then he has gone a long way in identifying 
“‘legislative intent’ or ‘legislative purpose.’”83 
The Louisiana state courts clearly failed to apply these 
interpretative methods properly in interpreting article 137 and its 
related provisions. One can only reach the conclusion that article 137 
does not offer class notice in mineral royalty lawsuits by employing 
these interpretative tenets to both the plain language and the policy 
behind Article 137. 
B. Applying the Tenets of Louisiana Statutory Interpretation to 
Article 137 
Both the Louisiana state courts and the Louisiana federal courts 
agree that notice is an absolute prerequisite to bringing a mineral 
royalty lawsuit.84 This point of agreement narrows the issue to 
whether article 137 allows class notice. Article 137 does not allow 
class notice, but not merely for the reasons that the Louisiana 
federal courts offer in their interpretation of article 137.85 
The Lewis/Duhé analysis—the one employed by the Louisiana 
state courts—is insufficient for multiple reasons.86 First, although 
the Louisiana courts correctly recognized that the plain language 
approach led to two different interpretations because the singular 
and the plural are interchangeable, the court failed to read article 137 
with the other royalty demand articles.87 If the court had done so, it 
would have found that absurd results occur with its conclusion that 
class notice is allowed under article 137, because different remedies 
arise depending on how the lessor responds.88 In this way, the 
Louisiana courts created a rule that requires a mineral lessor to 
either (1) respond to one of the class representatives and be bound to 
whatever remedy corresponds with the particular response given that 
                                                                                                             
 83. HETZEL, ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS, 565 (3d ed. 2001, Lexis Publishing). 
 84. See, e.g., Rebstock v. Birthright Oil & Gas Co., 406 So. 2d 636, 643 (La. 
App. 1 Cir. 1994). Both the Louisiana state courts and federal courts cited to 
Rebstock for this proposition. See also Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-
1906, 2011 WL 1868750, at *1, *11 (W.D. La. 2011). See also supra note 62 and 
accompanying discussion.  
 85. See supra Part I.B. 
 86. See supra Part I.A. 
 87. This is required by the Louisiana Civil Code. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 10 (2013). Correctly applying Civil Code article 10’s requirement would 
have led to the proper construction of the plain language of article 137 to in fact 
read the word “he” and “mineral lessor” in the singular because the other notice 
and response Mineral Code articles would not allow otherwise without an 
absurd result occurring. 
 88. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:138.1–140 (2013). 
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class representative or (2) send different responses to each 
individual plaintiff in the proposed class after conducting a rushed 
investigation into hundreds, if not thousands, of mineral leases.89 
Since article 137 notice is a process performed entirely before 
litigation, the only way for mineral lessees to avoid either making a 
rushed settlement or falling into one of the two aforementioned 
response problems would be to seek a declaratory judgment.90 
Forcing the mineral lessee to endure litigation expenses, rather than 
having a fair chance to enjoy their pre-litigation rights under a 
statutory framework, is clearly outside the intent of article 137.91 
It stands to reason that, in Lewis, Texaco believed that the five 
class representatives had no claim to royalty payments, so it 
responded by giving reasons for nonpayment.92 Thus, Texaco was 
placed in the position of not responding to the unnamed class 
members because it only responded to the five lessors who sent 
demand.93 However, such a response does not adequately respond to 
the claims of other mineral lessors in the lawsuit because Texaco 
could then be liable to the unnamed lessors for dissolution and/or 
hefty damages. Just because Texaco, or another mineral lessor in the 
same position, responds one way to the class representatives does 
not lead to the conclusion that Texaco or another mineral lessor 
would respond in kind to the others. This result is inequitable 
                                                                                                             
 89. The investigation must be done within 30 days under the threat of the 
vesting of the plaintiffs’ right to sue in court. Moreover, the lessee is left 
guessing as to whom he is supposed to send a response. Further, no rational 
plaintiff’s attorney would grant an oil company an extension that would delay 
the vesting of his client’s right of action, even assuming it were possible to do so 
under the Mineral Code or some other Louisiana law. The possibility of 
extending the time within which to give a response under Mineral Code article 
138 is beyond the scope of this comment. 
 90. This is exactly what Chevron did in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Vermillion 
Parish Sch. Bd., 128 F.Supp.2d 961 (W.D. La. 2001). Massive class action 
damages can be extremely damaging to a company’s bottom line, which is 
incentive to settle to avoid these damages plus the costs of defending a class 
action. Pair this fact with Louisiana’s history as a state rich in oil, gas, and other 
minerals, the Louisiana courts’ interpretation of article 137 will increase the 
financial risk of doing business in Louisiana. 
 91. See supra note 555 and accompanying discussion. See also LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt. (2013) (“The total effect of these articles, then, is to 
provide a spur to timely payment of royalties due while giving lessees a 
reasonable way to avoid the harsh remedy of cancellation. The spur is the 
special remedy.”). 
 92. See Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1006 
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1997). 
 93. See id.  
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because Texaco had no way of knowing whether it had to respond to 
all of the lessors individually or only the five class representatives.94 
Second, the Louisiana state court’s analysis discounts the fact 
that article 137 notice is a statutory prerequisite to the formation of 
a right of action granted under Louisiana law.95 Certainly, a 
proponent of the Louisiana state courts’ interpretation would argue 
that article 137 notice can be given by a class representative on 
behalf of unnamed class plaintiffs because the hallmark of a class 
action is indeed a named plaintiff, or plaintiffs, asserting rights of 
other plaintiffs that cannot, or choose not to, assert those rights 
alone.96 However, this argument exaggerates the similarities 
between the vesting of the right to bring a mineral royalty lawsuit 
in Louisiana to the vesting of other claims that are traditionally 
brought as a class action.97 In other words, for “traditional” mass 
claims, each plaintiff’s right of action rises with the defendant’s 
tortious action or breach of contract without requirements similar 
to article 137 before the right to bring the claim rises. For example, 
if consumers bring a traditional tort or contract class action against 
a leading electronic developer, there are rarely any statutory 
impediments to the vesting of each plaintiff’s right to sue. Reading 
article 137 to allow one plaintiff to effectively create another’s 
right of action by merely suggesting they could potentially make 
up a class with a common claim leads to an absurd result outside 
the purpose of article 137. 
Moreover, neither Rule 23, nor its Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure analogue, requires plaintiffs to give notice to defendants 
as a prerequisite to filing a class action.98 Rather, article 137 
provides that prerequisite because it triggers a plaintiff’s substantive 
right to bring a mineral royalty lawsuit, and Federal Rule 23 and 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 591 provide the 
mechanism through which the Louisiana-granted right may be 
enforced as a class action.99 While a mineral lessee might engage in 
                                                                                                             
 94. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S.Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013) 
(“[A] plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of 
the proposed class before the class is certified.”) (internal citations omitted). 
This notion would lead mineral lessors to believe that the class representatives 
cannot act on behalf of other mineral lessors prior to litigation, which includes 
giving article 137 notice. 
 95. See discussion supra Parts II, II.B. 
 96. In essence, the “notice” would be filing a lawsuit, which effectively says, “I 
am suing you, and all these other people might have the same claim as me.” 
However, this is not how article 137’s framework is designed or intended to operate. 
 97. For example, a mass tort or mass breach of contract. 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 accord LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 591 (2013). 
 99. See, e.g., Andry v. Murphy Oil, U.S.A., Inc., 710 So. 2d 1126, 1128-29 (La. 
App. 1 Cir. 1998) (“A class action is no more than a procedural device; it confers no 
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a policy to not pay its lessors, and thus be a prime circumstance for a 
class action,100 this wrongful act differs from a mass tort or mass 
contractual breach that can be brought as a class action because such 
actions do not require the plaintiffs to give the defendants notice 
prior to receiving the right to sue.101 However, article 137 operates 
to require potential plaintiffs to give potential defendant lessees pre-
litigation notice, which allows the lessee to investigate and/or settle 
the claim, before the right to sue develops. 
Finally, the doctrine of vicarious exhaustion does not apply by 
analogy to article 137 notice. Vicarious exhaustion allows a class 
representative who properly exhausted his administrative remedies 
prior to filing a lawsuit to pursue a class action on behalf of other 
class plaintiffs who have not exhausted administrative remedies.102 
If vicarious exhaustion is extended to article 137 notice, then a class 
representative who effected article 137 notice may be able to pursue 
a mineral royalty class action on behalf of unnamed plaintiffs who 
did not give notice. 
Although it seems article 137 may be similar to an exhaustion 
requirement because it requires a plaintiff to satisfy a requirement 
before filing a lawsuit, article 137 notice differs from an exhaustion 
requirement because the rationales and policies underlying the 
doctrine of exhaustion do not apply to article 137.103 Unlike cases 
that implicate Title VII, the Social Security Act, or other laws that 
require exhaustion of administrative remedies, article 137 does not 
have an administrative process that must be respected in order for 
                                                                                                             
 
substantive rights.”); Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 
(1980) (“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only, 
ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”). 
 100. See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 23 and LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 591 (2013). 
 101. The uniquely civil law concept of placing the obligor in default before 
having the right to obtain contractual breach damages does not bar a class action for 
breach of contract because filing a lawsuit is the same as putting an obligor in 
default. SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 1.11, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE 220 (2d ed. 2001). There is no such requirement at common law. Article 
137’s requirements are more stringent than the traditional method of putting the 
obligor in default. 
 102. Elizabeth S. Hess, Administrative Exhaustion and Class Actions: Rules, 
rights, Requirements, Remedies, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act Issue 
Resolved, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 773, 784 (2003) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 U.S. 405, 414 n. 8 (1975)). Certain federal statutes, like Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, require plaintiffs to first bring their claim through an appointed federal 
agency before suing in court. This is called an exhaustion requirement. Albamarle, 
and many other cases, stand for the proposition that exhaustion for one class plaintiff 
meets the exhaustion requirement for the other plaintiffs. 
 103. Id. Among those rationales are judicial efficiency and respecting the 
administrative scheme. 
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the parties and the judicial system to benefit and to promote the 
interests of justice.104 Rather, the purpose of article 137 is to delay 
the creation of a right of action to promote the policy goal of pre-
litigation settlement. However, with Title VII, the Social Security 
Act, and other laws that require administrative exhaustion, the right 
is present but must be tested via an administrative method before 
troubling the court. Thus, article 137 is a statutory prerequisite to a 
right to sue, rather than an exhaustion requirement. 
Further, even if article 137 were an exhaustion requirement, the 
doctrine of vicarious exhaustion has been refused in cases under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), where plaintiffs are required to file 
an administrative claim prior to suing in federal court.105 Although 
one such case allowed those class plaintiffs who satisfied the 
administrative prerequisite to proceed with the class, those who failed 
to exhaust were dismissed from the potential class.106 The court 
reasoned that “the purpose and the language of the statute requires 
claimants to have separately and individually satisfied all . . . 
requirements . . . .”107 In this way, the FTCA operates in the same 
way as article 137.108 The court further reasoned that the exhaustion 
requirement was intended to “improve and expedite disposition of . . . 
claims against the [defendant] by establishing a system of pre[-
]litigation settlement, to enable consideration of claims by the agency 
having the best information concerning the incident, and to ease court 
congestion and avoid unnecessary litigation.”109 Promoting pre-
litigation settlement and avoiding unnecessary litigation are exactly 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. (citing Weinburger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975) (“Exhaustion 
is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with 
agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently . . . to afford the 
parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile 
a record which is adequate for judicial review.”)). 
 105. See, e.g., Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 224 (8th Cir. 1977). 
However, if the named plaintiffs can show that they have the authority to act on 
behalf of the unnamed plaintiffs, the requirement would be satisfied. In 
Lunsford, the court found it was not because the named plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that they had authority to settle on behalf of the unnamed plaintiffs. 
Id. at 225-226. Undoubtedly, named article 137 plaintiffs would face the same 
difficulty with a class action. 
 106. Id. The court also noted that many circuits, including the Fifth Circuit, 
have held that administrative exhaustion is an “absolute prerequisite” to filing a 
lawsuit under the FTCA. See, e.g., Molinar v. United States 515 F.2d 246, 249 
(5th Cir. 1975). 
 107. Lunsford, 570 F.2d at 225 (internal citation omitted). This is similar to 
the proper interpretation of article 137. 
 108. See supra notes 18 and 62 and accompanying discussion. 
 109. Lunsford, 570 F.2d at 224 (internal citation omitted). 
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the same policy goals of article 137.110 Thus, even if article 137 notice 
can be considered an exhaustion requirement, the fact that article 137 
is more analogous to the FTCA than other actions with exhaustion 
requirements indicates that vicarious exhaustion would still be 
unavailable. 
As the Louisiana federal courts have recognized,111 the comment 
to article 137 provides “the total effect”—in other words, the 
policy—of the mineral royalty notice framework is “to provide a 
spur to timely payment . . . while giving lessees a reasonable way in 
which to avoid the harsh remedy of cancellation.”112 Thus, the 
Louisiana state courts’ interpretation of article 137 defeats the 
purpose of article 137 and its brethren articles.113 Although the plain 
language of the statute seems clear at first, the fact that the singular 
and the plural can be interchanged provides the potential for 
ambiguity. Continuing along the plain language textual analysis and 
reading article 137 with the other notice and remedy provisions, the 
only choice is to construe the plain language of article 137 to mean 
that each individual lessor must give his own notice. Allowing class 
notice leads to absurd results because unsatisfactory problems 
remain, such as (1) to whom the lessee’s response is owed; (2) what 
remedies result from responding to either one, a few, or all of the 
class plaintiffs; (3) pre-litigation settlement difficulties; and (4) the 
fact that a lessee has to sift through hundreds of mineral leases to 
determine how he is going to respond to each. Moreover, a mineral 
royalty class action cannot be equated to a “traditional” class action, 
such as a mass tort or contract class action, and the doctrine of 
vicarious exhaustion cannot apply by analogy to allow for vicarious 
notice under article 137. 
Had the state courts read article 137 with reference to the other 
articles in the notice and response scheme,114 they would have found 
that the plain language approach led only to the conclusion that 
using “he” in the singular was the appropriate interpretation in order 
to avoid absurd results,115 as well as to match article 137’s policy.116 
                                                                                                             
 110. See supra in this Part. Litigation might be unnecessary under Mineral 
Code articles 137-141 if the investigation revealed that the mineral lessee indeed 
correctly paid the lessor. This is a tremendous benefit that article 137’s pre-
litigation process offers. 
 111. See supra notes 18 and 62 and accompanying discussions. 
 112. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137, cmt. (2013).  
 113. See supra note 78 and accompanying discussion. 
 114. This is required by the Civil Code. See supra note 79. 
 115. See supra in this Part. 
 116. See Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1016 (La. 
App. 1 Cir. 1997) (Parro, J., dissenting). Judge Parro recognized that previous cases 
required each individual plaintiff to provide notice, even in those cases where there 
were more than merely two or three plaintiffs. Even though these cases are not the 
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The fact that the remedy is determined based on the response given 
by the lessor, the problems that class notice causes to the lessee’s 
giving a response, and the fact that the non-notifying lessors do not 
have a right to sue should have led the state courts to determine that 
both the text of the statute and the policy behind it lead to the 
prohibition of class notice in mineral royalty suits. Therefore, the 
proper construction of article 137, as it relates to class notice, is that 
each individual mineral lessor is required to provide his lessee with 
individual notice.117 
C. The Proper Construction of Article 137 Potentially Conflicts 
With Federal Rule 23 
As demonstrated in Williams v. Chesapeake Louisiana, Inc., the 
correct interpretation of article 137, which disallows class notice, 
presents a potential conflict with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.118 The proper interpretation of article 137 prohibits 
class notice,119 whereas Rule 23 does not require class plaintiffs to 
give notice to the defendant.120 Because of possible tension between 
the Louisiana rule and Rule 23, it is crucial to determine whether 
article 137’s proper interpretation survives a procedural Erie 
doctrine collision analysis in the wake of Shady Grove.121 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL ERIE DOCTRINE 
The law surrounding whether federal courts are to apply a state 
rule that seemingly collides with a Federal Rule endures a tumultuous 
history to say the least. The doctrine’s origins can be traced to Erie 
and, for the time being, culminates with the Shady Grove opinion. 
                                                                                                             
 
law, as discussed supra note 51, they are evidence of the proper construction of 
article 137. 
 117. Although irrelevant for the scope of this comment, the Louisiana state 
courts ought to apply this interpretation of article 137 as well. 
 118. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2013 WL 951251, *1, 
*6 (W.D. La. 2013). See also supra Part II.B. 
 119. See supra Part III.B. 
 120. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 (West 2013) with FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(c)(2). Rule 23(c)(2) merely requires class members to receive knowledge 
of a class action. Brief research reveals that cases which discuss Rule 23(c)(2) 
contemplate class representatives giving notice to members of the same class in 
order to maintain a class action in court, which is drastically different than 
article 137’s pre-litigation requirement that potential plaintiffs give notice to 
potential defendants in order to receive the right to sue in court. 
 121. Indeed, the Williams court diagnosed a conflict and applied the 
procedural Erie doctrine accordingly. 
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Many scholars consider Erie Railroad v. Tompkins to be 
among the watershed cases in Supreme Court jurisprudence.122 The 
Erie opinion redefined the federal courts’ position in the 
constitutional structure, particularly focusing on what law federal 
courts must apply when state law provides the cause of action.123 
Erie involved a plaintiff from Pennsylvania suing a railroad 
company, incorporated and operating out of New York, in 
diversity for negligence after he was hit by a protruding piece of 
the train while walking along the tracks.124 Unlike the common law 
of Pennsylvania, which placed a duty on railroads only for willful 
and wanton injury to people walking along their tracks, New York 
had no rule regarding a railroad’s duty to keep the area clear from 
hazards.125 Because neither Pennsylvania nor New York had a state 
statute that determined the railroad’s duty, the district court was 
able to determine the existence of duty on its own accord under the 
so-called “general law.”126 Thus, the district court ruled that the 
railroad had a duty of simple negligence to the plaintiff because the 
court was free to determine the railroad’s duty as a matter of the 
general commercial law, rather than applying Pennsylvania’s high 
negligence standard.127 
                                                                                                             
 122. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 123. See id. at 71. Also, the Rules of Decision Act of 1789 required that state 
law, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States 
otherwise preempt, be the rules of decision in trials at common law in the 
federal courts. 
 124. Id. at 69. The plaintiff sued in district court in New York, although 
being a Pennsylvania citizen and injured in that state. The strategy behind this 
decision is irrelevant for this comment. 
 125. Id. at 80. 
 126. Id. at 70. The concept of the “general law” developed from Swift v. 
Tyson, which held that federal courts sitting in diversity need not apply the 
common law of the state as declared by its highest court because of “free[dom] 
to exercise . . . independent judgment as to what the common law of the state 
is—or should be” in the absence of state, statutory law on the subject. Id. at 71 
(summarizing the holding of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)). This concept 
allowed federal courts sitting in diversity to make federal common law in areas 
in which the neither states, nor Congress, has spoken through statutory law, 
regardless of whether a state’s common law spoke on the matter at issue. See 
also Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law to Be Applied in Diversity 
Cases: A Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie 
Doctrine and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 22 (1995) (noting that, 
according to the Swift Court, the Rules of Decision Act did not require federal 
courts to follow state common law in diversity cases; rather, they were only 
bound to follow state statutory law that governs the decision.) [hereinafter Ides]. 
 127. Erie, 304 U.S. at 70. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s finding 
that the railroad had a duty to the plaintiff under the general law. Both the district 
and appellate court refused to consider the applicability of Pennsylvania law because 
the general law applied. 
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis, 
writing for the majority, took the opportunity to abolish the Swift 
doctrine and reconfigure the federal court system to its correct place 
in the constitutional structure.128 Justice Brandeis found that “no 
clause in the Constitution purports to confer” the power to either the 
federal court or Congress to declare substantive rules of common 
law applicable in a state.129 Further, echoing the Rules of Decision 
Act, the Court held that, in “any case,” the law to be applied in 
federal courts, except in matters in which federal law preempts, is 
the law of the state that provides the cause of action.130 Justice 
Brandeis concluded by saying that the Swift doctrine “invaded rights 
which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to the several states” and 
adopted Justice Holmes’ noteworthy Black & White Taxicab Co. v. 
Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co. dissent, claiming “‘the voice adopted 
by the State as its own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its 
Supreme Court) should utter the last word.’”131 
Because of Erie and the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, two types of Erie doctrine cases developed over the 
decades: (1) cases that involved conflicts with state law and federal 
common law and (2) cases that involved conflicts between state 
rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.132 Although Erie 
clarified that the federal courts must apply the law of the state that 
gives rise to the lawsuit, it was unclear whether a federal court must 
employ the Erie doctrine when a state rule collided with the newly 
enacted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.133 The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure seek to provide a uniform system of procedural 
rules for the federal courts, and the Rules Enabling Act (REA) 
delegated Congress’ Article III power to create and administer rules 
for the federal courts to the Supreme Court.134 However, this 
                                                                                                             
 128. Ides, supra note 126 at 24–26, provides a more in-depth discussion of 
Justice Brandeis’ denouncement of the Swift doctrine than is warranted in this 
comment. 
 129. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
 130. Id. (emphasis added). 
 131. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow 
Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532–36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 132. Compare Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 529 (1958) 
with Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 133. See Ides, supra note 126, at 29 (“Of course the Erie decision had no 
direct bearing on the legitimacy of the federal rules . . . Congress, pursuant to 
Articles I and III and the necessary and proper clause, has ample power to 
provide rules of procedure for federal courts.”). 
 134. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress . . . may 
establish.” (emphasis added)); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 
(1941); Ides, supra note 126, at 29. 
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delegation of power comes with the caveat that the Federal Rules 
may not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”135 This 
second type of Erie doctrine cases developed the “procedural Erie 
doctrine.” 
The first post-Erie Supreme Court case to tackle a collision 
problem was Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc.136 In Sibbach, the 
plaintiff refused to submit to a physical examination, supporting this 
refusal with a state rule that prohibited compulsion of a physical 
examination; however, Federal Rule 35 permits compulsion of 
physical examinations in federal court cases.137 In holding that Rule 
35 applied, the Court reasoned that if the “rule really regulates 
procedure,” then the Federal Rule is within the ambit of the Court’s 
delegated powers under the REA and must apply because of the 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.138 Because of this reasoning, the 
first collision analysis necessarily assessed whether the Federal Rule 
that conflicted with the state rule was “procedural,” rather than 
“substantive,” in a way that would alter a substantive right, which 
would violate the REA.139 If the Federal Rule indeed “really 
regulated procedure,” then it would apply in the face of a conflicting 
state rule. 
Then, in 1965, the Supreme Court’s Hanna v. Plumer decision 
applied the Sibbach test with crucial nuances, establishing the 
modern framework for analyzing potential conflicts between state 
rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.140 In Hanna, the 
plaintiff completed domiciliary service upon the executor of the 
defendant’s estate pursuant to Rule 4; however, Rule 4 did not 
mirror the state rule, which required personal service on the 
executor.141 In holding that Rule 4 controlled, the Hanna court first 
found the REA requires a contrary state law to yield to a Federal 
Rule if the Federal Rule “‘really regulates procedure’” and does 
not violate the REA’s state substantive rights protection.142 Next, 
and most important for this comment, Hanna recognized that Erie 
did not “command . . . displacement of a Federal Rule,” but rather 
required an analysis into whether the Federal Rule was even broad 
                                                                                                             
 135. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(b) (West 2014). 
 136. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 137. Id. at 6–7. Therefore, the Court had to determine whether the state rule 
or Rule 35 applied to this diversity case in federal court. 
 138. Id. at 16. 
 139. Id. at 15. 
 140. 380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965) (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14). Sibbach’s 
test is referred to as the “really regulates procedure” test. 
 141. Id. at 461–62. 
 142. Id. at 464–65 (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14). 
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enough to cover the point in dispute.143 Hanna is an important case 
because it also provides the modern analysis for resolving conflicts 
between state law and federal law.144 
In Walker v. Armco Steel Co.,145 a unanimous Supreme Court 
understood that the Hanna test was premised on a direct collision 
between a state rule and federal rule, and the state rule applied if 
there was no collision.146 Walker involved a conflict between a state 
rule, which deemed an action “commenced” when service was 
effectuated, and Federal Rule 3, which commences the action when 
suit is filed.147 Finding no collision between the state rule and Rule 3 
because both could coexist, the Court held that the state rule 
determined when the action commenced.148 
Decades of procedural Erie jurisprudence reached a climax in 
Shady Grove. In this decision, the Supreme Court was unable to 
reach a majority, leaving courts, such as the district court in 
Williams v. Chesapeake, to use Justice Stevens’ analysis by virtue of 
the Marks rule.149 To understand how substantial the rift among the 
                                                                                                             
 143. Id. at 470 (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1953)). In Palmer, 
a unanimous Supreme Court completely avoided a conflict by reading Rule 8(c) to 
not cover the same issue as a state rule. Palmer involved a dispute over which party 
bore the burden of proving contributory negligence. The plaintiff argued that Rule 
8(c) makes contributory negligence an affirmative defense that the defendant must 
prove. Rejecting this argument, the Court held that Erie required application of state 
burden of proof law since Rule 8(c) “covers only the manner of pleading,” not the 
burden of proof. 
 144. According to Ides, supra note 126, at 74–87, the Hanna framework 
functions as follows: (1) Determine whether a federal statute or state statute applies; 
(2) If the Constitution, a federal statute, or treaty applies, then the Supremacy Clause 
operates to make the federal law function; (3) Determine whether there is a collision 
between the state rule and Federal Rule, and apply the Federal Rule if the REA is not 
violated; (4) If no Federal Rule applies, apply the “outcome determinative” test, 
which analyzes whether failing to apply a state rule in federal court changes the 
outcome of the case merely because it is brought in federal court over state court. 
Application of the test should keep in mind Erie’s twin aims of preventing forum 
shopping and keeping the results the same in federal court as it would be in state 
court. This comment focuses on step 3. 
 145. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
 146. Id. at 749. See also Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–
5 (1987), which was a companion case to Walker (“The initial step [in analyzing 
whether a state rule and Federal Rule collide] is to determine whether, when fairly 
construed, the scope of [the] Federal Rule . . . is ‘sufficiently broad to cause a ‘direct 
collision’ with the state law or, implicitly, to ‘control the issue’ before the court, 
thereby leaving no room for the operation of that law.”). 
 147. Walker, 466 U.S. at 743. 
 148. Id. at 750–53. The Court also found Rule 3 gives “no indication that the 
Rule was intended to toll a state statute of limitations.” 
 149. See supra note 68. See also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining 
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed 
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Shady Grove Justices really was, it is essential to acknowledge how 
much the plurality deviated from the lower courts. Moreover, Shady 
Grove failed to make any sense of the inconsistent approaches to 
determine whether there is a collision between a state rule and a 
Federal Rule.150 
Shady Grove involved a group of doctors who sued Allstate after 
the insurer failed to reimburse them for medical services rendered to 
its insureds.151 Allstate objected to removal to federal court as a 
class action under the Class Action Fairness Act152 because a New 
York statute precluded class actions for claims with statutory 
damages, which the Shady Grove doctors’ claim involved.153 The 
New York rule created tension with Federal Rule 23, which governs 
class actions and does not have such a limitation; instead providing, 
Rule 23 stipulates prerequisites to filing and maintaining a class 
action in federal court.154 
Both the district court and the appellate court decided that New 
York’s rule applied, finding that the legislative purpose of § 901(b) 
does not lead to the conclusion that the New York rule collides with 
Rule 23.155 The Second Circuit, in finding that New York’s rule 
                                                                                                             
 
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds . . .’”) (internal citation omitted). 
 150. See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the 
Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1135–36 
(2011) (noting—and providing examples—that the Supreme Court has used “an 
array” of different tests to articulate the standard for determining if there is an 
unavoidable collision between a state rule and Federal Rule) [hereinafter 
Steinman]. Resolving this issue is outside the scope of this comment. 
 151. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 
397 (2010). The Shady Grove doctors added others who Allstate allegedly failed 
to pay and made it a class action. 
 152. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (West 2014) (providing minimal diversity 
plus $5 million amount in controversy federal jurisdiction requirements in order 
to promote removal of state class action claims to federal court). 
 153. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397. See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (2013) 
(“[If] a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of 
recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action 
to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by 
statute may not be maintained as a class action.” (emphasis added)). 
 154. Id. at 396. Also, compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (2013) with FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23. 
 155. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F.Supp.2d 
467, 472 (E.D. N.Y. 2006) (“This [statute] was ‘designed to discourage massive 
class actions for statutory violations where it would be difficult to identify the 
members of the class and where recovery of the statutory minimum by each member 
results in a ‘annihilatory punishment.’”). See also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., 
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Every district court to 
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applied because it was “no analogue”  to Rule 23,156 employed the 
collision test from Burlington Northern and Walker,157 but prudently 
indicated that the “Federal Rules should be given their plain 
meaning.”158 Conducting this analysis, the Second Circuit found 
that: (1) Rule 23, plainly read, is “not sufficiently broad” to cause a 
direct collision with a plain reading of § 901(b),159 (2) allowing the 
plaintiffs to pursue this action as a class in federal court would 
“circumvent” New York’s “state policy” to make the class action 
device unavailable in suits involving statutory penalties because the 
incentivizing element of the class action device was not present,160 
and (3) application of the New York rule does not threaten any 
essential characteristic of the federal court system.161 
When the Supreme Court decided Shady Grove, the lower courts’ 
prudent reasoning only remained undisturbed inside Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion. The Scalia plurality rejected the lower 
courts’ proper application of procedural Erie doctrine, whereas 
Justice Stevens believed that, while Ginsburg’s dissent and the lower 
courts’ framework was correct, it was misapplied. Therefore, Shady 
Grove produced a plurality decision that held that Rule 23 applied to 
the case over a New York rule, but no particular analysis was able to 
carry the day as binding precedent for certain guidance.162 
                                                                                                             
 
consider this question in any detail has concluded that there is no conflict. We 
agree.”). 
 156. Shady Grove, 549 F.3d at 143. 
 157. Id. at 142 (“In analyzing whether a state rule conflicts with a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure, we must “determine whether, when fairly construed, 
the scope of [the Federal Rule] is ‘sufficiently broad’ to cause a ‘direct collision’ 
with the state law or, implicitly, to ‘control the issue’ before the court, thereby 
leaving no room for the operation of that law.” (internal citations omitted)). See 
also supra note 146 and accompanying discussion. 
 158. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 159. Id. at 143 (“Rule 23 does not control the issue to which substantive causes 
of action may be brought as class actions or which remedies may be sought by class 
action plaintiffs.”). 
 160. Id. at 144–45 (“[Precluding class actions in cases that impose statutory 
damages] makes sense, given that class actions are designed in large part to 
incentivize plaintiffs to sue when the economic benefit would otherwise be too 
small, particularly when taking into account the court costs and attorneys’ fees 
typically incurred.”). 
 161. Id. at 145. Although “the Erie doctrine does not require a federal court 
to apply a state rule where it would pose a threat to ‘[a]n essential characteristic 
of [the federal court] system,’” the Second Circuit found no reason to believe the 
“availability of a class action device in all circumstances is an ‘essential 
characteristic’ of the federal court system, particularly where the very cause of 
action that Shady Grove seeks to assert is a creature of New York state statute.” 
 162. Moreover, because Justice Stevens has since retired from the Court and 
our lack of knowledge of how Justice Kagan will stand on this issue, we are still 
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The Shady Grove Court split over three issues: (1) whether § 
901(b) and Rule 23 collided, (2) whether federal courts ought to 
diagnose collisions between state rules and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure with “sensitivity to state interests,” and (3) how to 
determine whether or not a Federal Rule falls within the ambit of the 
REA’s authorization.163 Writing for a plurality, Justice Scalia applied 
Burlington Northern’s collision test that asked whether the Federal 
Rule controls the question in dispute.164 Justice Scalia made quick 
work of the initial collision analysis, claiming that a plain reading of 
Rule 23 “creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit 
meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action.”165 
Because of this “categorical rule,” and the fact that § 901(b) 
“answer[s] the same question,” it cannot apply in diversity suits 
unless Rule 23 exceeds the REA’s authorization.166 In finding a direct 
collision, Justice Scalia found the statute’s clear text determines 
whether there is a collision with the Federal Rule.167 Since he found a 
collision existed, Justice Scalia proceeded to the next part of Hanna’s 
analysis,168 which assesses whether the Federal Rule is within the 
REA’s authorization.169 Justice Scalia elected to strictly apply 
Sibbach’s “really regulates procedure” test to determine that Rule 23 
governs the manner and the means by which litigants’ rights are 
enforced, which does not violate the REA’s prohibition on 
substantive rights infringement.170 Therefore, Justice Scalia found 
Rule 23 to apply over § 901(b). 
                                                                                                             
 
“left hanging” on what the proper analysis is or should be. See also Steinman, 
supra note 150 (noting the different collision analyses before Shady Grove). The 
fractured plurality Shady Grove decision certainly failed to sort this issue out. 
This comment will not opine on which Justice’s opinion was proper. 
 163. Although this comment does not directly consider issues 2 and 3, Professor 
Margaret Thomas offers interesting insight on them. Margaret S. Thomas, 
Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Through the Federalism Canons 
of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS & PUB. POL’Y 187 (2013). 
 164. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 
398 (2010) (citing Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987)). 
 165. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398. 
 166. Id. at 399. Justice Scalia found that § 901(b) answered the question of 
what actions may be brought and sustained as class actions in federal court, 
which was exactly what Rule 23 answers. 
 167. Id. at 403. 
 168. See Ides supra note 128, at 74–87. The applicability of the Hanna 
framework is one of the only things the Shady Grove Court unanimously agreed 
upon. 
 169. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406 (“We must therefore confront head-on 
whether Rule 23 falls within the statutory authorization.”). 
 170. Id. at 407. 
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Justice Stevens, while agreeing with the plurality’s result, took a 
different route in finding that Rule 23 controls over § 901(b).171 To 
determine whether a collision between § 901(b) and Rule 23 existed, 
Justice Stevens’ inquiry opted to apply a blend of Burlington 
Northern’s “leaves no room for the operation of [state] law” test and 
Walker’s acceptance of coexisting state rule and  Federal Rule, so 
long as a plain reading of both rules aloows for such coexistence.172 
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens believed that a Federal Rule 
violates the REA if the Federal Rule displaces a state rule conferring 
a “state right or remedy that . . . functions to define the scope of the 
state-created right[s].”173 Notwithstanding his agreement with 
Justice Ginsburg on many issues, Justice Stevens found that Rule 23 
applies whenever a federal court is asked to certify a class action.174 
He also did not see enough proof of substantive, state policy goals or 
the conferring of a right in finding that applying Rule 23 in this case 
would overcome § 901(b) and violate the REA.175 
Justice Ginsburg, with three other justices, dissented and applied 
the same analysis and reached the same conclusion as the district 
court and the Second Circuit.176 Her analysis centered around one 
crucial question: “Is this conflict really necessary?”177 Justice 
Ginsburg recounted the legislative history of § 901(b), which she 
concluded successfully demonstrated New York’s purpose in 
passing § 901(b) to preclude class actions in suits with statutory 
damages to “prevent the exorbitant inflation of penalties [through 
the class action device]—remedies the New York Legislature 
created with individual suits in mind.”178 In other words, New York 
sought to enforce a policy of restricting particular lawsuits to 
individual plaintiffs, rather than classes of plaintiffs, in order to 
rescue particular defendants from paying out massive class action 
damages. Therefore, Justice Ginsburg found that “Rule 23 describes 
a method of enforcing a [class action] claim for relief, while § 
                                                                                                             
 171. Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 172. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 173. Id. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 174. Id. at 429–30 (Stevens, J., concurring). On this crucial point, Justice Stevens 
agreed with Justice Scalia. 
 175. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432–33 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“It is . . . hard 
to see how § 901(b) . . . serves the function of defining New York’s rights or 
remedies . . . The legislative history, moreover, does not clearly describe a 
judgment that § 901(b) would operate as a limitation on New York’s statutory 
damages.” Justice Stevens’ perceived lack of legislative judgment for § 901(b) to 
be a right or remedy under New York law proved to be a deciding factor in the 
Shady Grove decision). 
 176. See supra note 1555 and accompanying discussion. 
 177. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 178. Id. at 445 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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901(b) defines the dimensions of the claim itself.”179 In the lack of a 
collision, § 901(b) should have applied. 
V.  ARTICLE 137 AND FEDERAL RULE 23 DO NOT COLLIDE 
Clearly, Shady Grove’s fractured opinion thrust a wrench into 
applying Hanna’s initial collision inquiry.180 Luckily, for the 
purposes of the sustainability of article 137’s preclusion of class 
notice, the Shady Grove opinion does not matter. While the Justices 
disagreed on how to apply the collision analysis, all would certainly 
agree with the proposition that a rule that governs pre-litigation 
behavior and a rule that governs the requirements for a class action 
do not collide.181 Notwithstanding the Justices’ differing opinions 
regarding the application of the initial collision inquiry, all agreed 
that Hanna, Walker, and Burlington Northern’s framework is the 
proper analysis.182 Thus, the only relevant issue left for this 
comment is to demonstrate that article 137 and Federal Rule 23 in 
no way collide because article 137 is pre-litigation and Rule 23 is 
contemporaneous with litigation. 
Article 137 is a pre-litigation rule that prevents a right of action 
from developing until it is satisfied, whereas Rule 23 enumerates the 
requirements to maintain a class action in a federal court.183 
Moreover, § 901(b) precludes certain claims from being brought as 
class actions even though the plaintiffs have a right to bring the 
claim,184 whereas article 137 restricts class actions only to those 
plaintiffs who give article 137 notice and trigger their right to sue.185 
No right of action is present and vicarious exhaustion does not apply 
                                                                                                             
 179. Id. at 447 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court, I am convinced, finds conflict where none is necessary. 
Mindful of the history behind § 901(b)’s enactment, the thrust of our precedent, 
and the substantive-rights limitation in the Rules Enabling Act, I conclude, as 
did the Second Circuit and every District Court to have considered the question 
in detail, that Rule 23 does not collide with § 901(b).”). 
 180. Moreover, Justice Stevens has since retired from the Supreme Court, and 
we have yet to discover Justice Kagan’s stance on this issue. This raises questions as 
to the viability of Shady Grove’s take on the procedural Erie doctrine. 
 181. See supra Part IV.  
 182. See id. 
 183. This avoids falling into Justice Scalia’s “categorical rule” trap, which 
Justice Stevens agreed with, and would certainly satisfy Justice Ginsburg. Moreover, 
even if there was a collision, it is arguable that article 137 confers a Louisiana-
created right, and thus operates over Rule 23 under Justice Stevens’ analysis. See id. 
 184. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (2013). 
 185. See supra Part III.B. 
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by analogy to allow class representatives who actually gave notice 
to satisfy the requirement for the unnamed plaintiffs who did not.186 
Moreover, article 137 avoids the pitfalls that § 901(b) fell into 
with Justice Scalia’s and Stevens’ opinions because, whereas § 
901(b) specifically precludes already-vested claims from being 
brought as a class action under New York law,187 article 137 
imposes no such limit to class actions. Instead, article 137’s proper 
interpretation provides a requirement that prevents a mineral royalty 
claim from vesting in order to promote pre-litigation settlement and 
allow mineral lessees to conduct a fair investigation into the lessor’s 
complaints without the looming specter of a damaging class action 
lawsuit.188 
Article 137 limits class actions in a drastically different way 
than § 901(b) did in Shady Grove. Article 137 does not confer the 
original right to sue until each plaintiff performs a particular 
action. It thus follows that a class action cannot be filed on behalf 
of those who did not satisfy that requirement.189 On the other hand, 
§ 901(b) restricts class actions even after each plaintiff obtains the 
right to bring an action under that law. It is this feature of § 901(b), 
which article 137 does not possess, that brought it within the scope 
of the plurality’s collision finding.190 
Therefore, unlike the collision that occurred in Shady Grove, 
Rule 23 is not broad enough to cover the pre-litigation activity that 
article 137 regulates. Because the proper interpretation of article 
137 does not fall anywhere near the scope of Rule 23, it must be 
applied in federal courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The concepts discussed in this comment compel the conclusion 
that the proper interpretation of article 137 does not collide with 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.191 Thus, the 
                                                                                                             
 186. See id. 
 187. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (2013). 
 188. See supra Part III.B. 
 189. See id. The inability of vicarious exhaustion being a suitable analogy 
precludes vicarious notice. 
 190. In other words, Rule 23 is not broad enough to cover the pre-litigation 
activity that article 137 regulates. See also notes 153 and 166 and accompanying 
discussions. It is beyond the scope of this comment to opine on which Shady 
Grove opinion was correct, including whether § 901(b) indeed collided with 
Rule 23. It is enough to know that article 137 is nowhere near colliding with 
Rule 23, unlike § 901(b). 
 191. It is beyond the scope of this comment to opine on the propriety of 
employing the class action device in mineral royalty suits when each individual 
plaintiff must provide article 137 notice. 
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proper interpretation should apply in Louisiana federal courts. 
Because of this, mineral royalty class actions are substantially 
restricted to those class plaintiffs that successfully effectuate article 
137 notice.192 
This comment fills the void the Louisiana Supreme Court left 
when it declined to answer the Fifth Circuit’s certified question of 
whether article 137 offers class notice. Although this comment 
provides an interpretation of article 137 that is in line with the 
tenets of Louisiana statutory construction, potential action of 
Louisiana’s highest court nevertheless remains. Further, the 
Supreme Court of the United States, especially with the retirement 
of Justice Stevens and placement of Justice Kagan, could offer 
authoritative procedural Erie doctrine in this post-Shady Grove 
era.193 However, at this juncture, the proper interpretation of article 
137 survives a proper procedural Erie analysis, leading to the 
conclusion that class notice is unavailable in Louisiana federal 
courts in mineral royalty class actions, which restricts these classes 
to plaintiffs who successfully effectuate article 137 notice. 
William K. Wright IV* 
  
                                                                                                             
 192. See supra note 45 and accompanying discussion. 
 193. Particularly in the realm of the initial collision inquiry, which is the focus of 
this comment. 
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